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Abstract
There has been an intense discussion, albeit largely an implicit one,
concerning the inference of causal hypotheses from statistical correla-
tions in quantum mechanics ever since John Bell’s first statement of his
notorious theorem in 1966. As is well known, its focus has mainly been
the so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (“EPR”) thought experiment,
and the ensuing observed correlations in real EPR like experiments.
But although implicitly the discussion goes as far back as Bell’s work,
it is only in the last two decades that it has become recognizably and
explicitly a debate about causal inference in the quantum realm. The
bulk of this paper is devoted to a review of three influential arguments
in the philosophical literature that aim to show that causal models for
the EPR correlations are impossible, due to Bas Van Fraassen, Daniel
Hausman and Huw Price. I contend that all these arguments are incon-
clusive since they contain premises or presuppositions that are false,
unwarranted, or at least controversial. Five different causal models are
outlined that seem perfectly viable for the EPR correlations. These
models are then employed to illustrate various difficulties with the
premises and presuppositions underlying Van Fraassen’s, Hausman’s
and Price’s arguments. In all cases it is argued that the difficulties
cut deep against these authors’ own theories of causation and causal
inference. My conclusions are that causal models for the EPR correla-
tions certainly remain viable, that philosophical work is still required
to assess their relative virtues, and that in any case the mere theoreti-
cal conceivability and empirical possibility of these models sheds deep
doubts over Van Fraassen’s, Hausman’s and (important elements in)
Price’s theories of causation and causal inference.
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1 The EPR Correlations
In 1935 Einstein wrote and published jointly with two collaborators a noto-
rious paper describing a thought experiment with correlated entangled pairs
of particles.1 The stated aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the quan-
tum theory is incomplete since it does not describe fully all the “elements”
of quantum reality, yet the paper is nowadays celebrated as the source of
the burgeoning literature on what is known as “quantum non-locality”. On
the one hand as Arthur Fine2 and other have shown the real conclusion
of the EPR argument is rather a dilemma between locality (in EPR’s own
characteristic definition this entails that a disturbance of the state of the
nearby particle can exert no change of any of the properties of the distant
particle) and completeness. On the other hand Bell’s theorem is taken by
many to demonstrate that any empirically adequate completion of the quan-
tum theory is committed to the existence of EPR-like correlations between
the measurement events of certain properties of distant particles that have
interacted in the past. It follows that the conclusion that actually does fol-
low from the EPR argument is the existence of distant correlations. Indeed
these correlations have been tested experimentally on numerous occasions
with the same positive result.
David Bohm’s version of the EPR thought experiment is most often dis-
cussed, and it is this version that provides the model for most of the real
experiments that have actually been carried out.3 In this Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen-Bohm (EPR-Bohm) experiment two particles (“1” and “2”) move
in opposite directions, after either interacting in the past, or having been
created simultaneously in some past decay event “E”. As a result of their
1(Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, 1935). The exposition in this section borrows from a
previous paper of mine, (Sua´rez, 2004).
2(Fine, 1987).
3(Bohm, 1951, chapter 22).
2
interacting history, quantum mechanics describes their composite state as
an entangled singlet state. The initial angular momentum is zero, so their
values of spin must be correlated throughout. Any particle’s spin can be
measured by means of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus. This is a magnetome-
ter that impresses a force upon the particle proportional to its spin value,
thereby correlating perfectly the particle’s position with its spin value at the
time the particle interacts with the magnetometer. A Stern-Gerlach appa-
ratus can be rotated along 360 degrees, in order to measure the particle’s
spin value along any direction.
In a Minkowski space-time diagram, both particles describe symmetric
paths along the time axis (see figure 1). The Stern-Gerlach apparati that
measure these particles’ spin at each wing of the experiment are at rest in
the laboratory frame so their world lines are represented by vertical lines
“A1” and “A2” in that frame. Each time the experiment is repeated, lab-
oratory technicians are at freedom to select a particular orientation of the
measurement apparatus which will result in a measurement of spin along
the corresponding direction. Such setting events are denoted by “a” and
“b”. The two arrows pointing towards such events represent the fact that
each of those setting events is controllable by experimental means. (In the
language of the causal inference literature: they are exogenous variables,
and are moreover controllable by agents.) Each particle’s spin is measured
by means of a measurement interaction between the particle and the asso-
ciated measuring device on the corresponding wing. The outcomes that are
produced are denoted by “s1” and “s2” respectively, and are known as the
“outcome-events”.
An important feature of the EPR-Bohm experiments is that these out-
come-events are spacelike connected, i.e. they lie outside each other’s light-
cone. Thus a signal from one event to the other must travel at speed greater
than the speed of light, during a finite part of its trajectory at least. The
implications of this fact regarding the special theory of relativity are both
deep and complex, and have been the object of an intense debate.4 Al-
though this debate is not directly relevant to much of what I will say here,
it is nonetheless important for the overall assessment of the prospects of
causal inference in quantum mechanics. But the importance lies in the pos-
sibility of direct-cause models for the EPR correlations, as will be seen later,
and I will center the bulk of my discussion upon the other type of causal
models available, namely common cause models. It seems legitimate not to
enter the debate in full here (other than by mentioning some options in the
interpretation of relativity) since doing so can only strengthen the position
defended in this paper, namely that there is a very large range of different
causal models available for the EPR correlations.
4See e.g. (Maudlin, 1995).
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Figure 1.
Let us now return to the quantum mechanical description of the EPR-
Bohm experiment. According to quantum mechanics, for the type of parti-
cles involved, there are only two possible values of spin in any direction of
measurement (θ): positive spin (↑θ) and negative spin (↓θ). Quantum me-
chanics describes the spin states of the composite system of both particles
at either the time of emission or measurement by means of what is known
as the singlet state (here “1” and “2” refer to each particle):
Ψ =
1√
2
(| ↑1θ〉| ↓2θ〉 − | ↓1θ〉| ↑2θ〉).
The theory offers two kinds of probabilistic predictions. First, it offers
predictions about the outcomes of measurements performed on each parti-
cle. To calculate these, we must first apply what is known as the axiom of
reduction, which allows us to derive the state of each particle, individually
taken:5
W1 =
1
2
| ↑1θ〉〈↑1θ |+ 12 | ↓1θ〉〈↓1θ |,
W2 =
1
2
| ↑2θ〉〈↑2θ |+ 12 | ↓2θ〉〈↓2θ |.
We can apply the quantum statistical algorithm to W1 and W2 in order
to calculate the probabilities of outcomes of measurements performed on
5See e.g. (Hughes, 1989, pp. 149-150).
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each particle in any direction θ:
prob(| ↑1θ〉) = 〈Ψ| ↑1θ〉〈↑1θ |Ψ〉 =
(
1√
2
)2
=
1
2
.
prob(| ↓1θ〉) = prob(| ↑2θ〉) = prob(| ↓2θ〉) = prob(| ↑1θ〉) = 12 .
It is important to emphasise thatW1 andW2 are the states of each of the
particles individually taken, consistently with the fact that the state of the
composite is the singlet state. In other words the axiom of reduction allows
us to derive uniquely W1 and W2 from Ψ. There is however no similar
axiom in quantum mechanics that would allow us to derive Ψ uniquely
from W1 and W2. And this is at the heart of the notorious fact that the
singlet state of the composite system is underdetermined by the states of
its component subsystems, which often gives rise to the claims of quantum
holism and quantum non-separability.6 So our calculations of predictions for
measurement results on each particle on the basis ofW1 andW2 are perfectly
consistent with the singlet state of the composite, and in fact required by
it. But the predictions do not require the singlet state, and are instead
consistent with all kinds of states of the composite that result from a mere
phase difference from the singlet state (i.e. the minus sign in the singlet
state could for all we care here be replaced by a plus sign).
In other words, the description offered by the singlet state Ψ of the com-
posite system contains the greatest possible amount of information about
both systems. By contrast, if we only consider the states of the systems
individually taken, W1 and W2, we can see that we have lost relevant in-
formation. Erwin Schro¨dinger was perhaps the first to note that “a portion
of knowledge of the composite system” is found “squandered on conditional
statements that operate between the subsystems” in the form of correlations
between the measurement events that we can perform on each system.7 In-
deed by applying the quantum statistical algorithm to the entangled pair
of particles in the singlet state Ψ we find the following conditional proba-
bilities of outcomes of measurements on either particle, conditional on any
6I do not pursue these claims further in this paper. But a referee helpfully pointed
out that both the arguments I describe in section 3, and the models I present in response
in section 4 presuppose the assumption of separability, roughly: that in EPR-like situa-
tions it is perfectly legitimate to postulate the existence of two distinct physical systems
at the wings of the experiment, however entangled their states. It might be harder to
articulate some causal explanations for EPR correlations under a contrary assumption of
non-separability, but then it would also be harder, I think, to articulate any arguments
against such types of explanations. Moreover there is a sense in which any non-separable
model of EPR is by definition causal: It merely postulates correlations between properties
of one and the same entity.
7(Schro¨dinger, 1933, p. 161).
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particular outcome of any measurement made on the other particle:
prob(↑2θ′ / ↓1θ) = prob(↑2θ
′ ∧ ↓1θ)
prob(↑1θ) =
1
2
sin2
1
2
θθ′.
In the specific case θ = θ′ we obtain the following conditional probabilities,
which we can immediately see imply a case of anticorrelation:
prob(↑2θ / ↓1θ) = 1 = prob(↓2θ / ↑1θ),
prob(↓2θ / ↓1θ) = 0 = prob(↑2θ / ↑1θ).
This means that if we measure both particles’ spin along the same direc-
tion, the singlet state predicts an anti-correlation between the spin values.
If we measure the first particle’s spin in the θ direction, and we find the out-
come corresponding to “positive” spin (↑θ), we can predict that the outcome
of a later measurement of the second particle’s spin in the same direction
will be “negative” (↓θ) with certainty.
The kind of necessity expressed by these conditional statements, accord-
ing to quantum mechanics, is merely nomological, since quantum mechanics
does not describe any physical process capable of transmitting the informa-
tion required from one system to the other. This of course is not to say
that such a mechanism does not really exist. It is consistent to affirm both
horns of the EPR argument’s dilemma: i.e. that there are correlations be-
tween distant particles and that the theory is incomplete. What it means
is that a causal explanation of these correlations would have to introduce
some type of mechanism, or additional physical hypothesis, to explain these
conditional statements. In a causal model the “additional portion of knowl-
edge” would not be “squandered in conditional statements”. For instance,
in a model where the causes operate directly between the wings of the ex-
periment, the “extra” portion of knowledge could be transmitted directly
from one subsystem to the other by means of “mark-transmitters”.8 In a
common cause model by contrast the causal influence might well follow the
very same particle’ trajectories. In any case, causal structure will need to
be postulated that is not described by quantum theory, but will hopefully
be consistent with it.
2 Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause
The EPR-Bohm experiment yields a typical case of statistical correlation,
which is both predicted by a theory, and experimentally verified; it is some-
what surprising in retrospect that it took so long for it to be seen as fertile
8“Mark-transmitter” is the term employed in both Hans Reichenbach’s (Reichenbach,
1956, p. 198) and Wesley Salmon’s (Salmon, 1984, pp. 148-150) theories of causality.
Nothing I say in this paper however hinges on such accounts.
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ground for the application of techniques of causal inference from statisti-
cal data. Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause provides one of the
earliest and most influential techniques, together with a complex theory of
probabilistic causation and causal structure. In deriving his notorious the-
orem Bell employed essentially Reichenbach’s techniques, unbeknownst to
him. Bell did not identify his statistical conditions as techniques of causal
inference, but instead took them to be conditions on physical “locality”. It
was the philosopher Bas Van Fraassen instead who, in a couple of influential
and important papers in the 1980’s, first explicitly analysed Bell’s theorem
in terms of Reichenbachian conditions of causal inference. Van Fraassen’s ar-
gument has been immensely influential in drawing philosophers of physics to
sceptical conclusions regarding causation in the quantum realm. In this sec-
tion I intend to describe Reichenbach’s conditions for causal inference, and
Van Fraassen’s analysis of Bell’s theorem in terms of these conditions; in the
next section I will analyse Van Fraassen’s full argument against causal mod-
els for the EPR correlations, together with related arguments to the same
effect by Daniel Hausman and Huw Price. My conclusions will be critical,
and I will defend that this scepticism is premature.
At its heart Reichenbach’s theory of causal inference is extremely sim-
ple. Its central principle (the “principle of the common cause”) asserts that
“if an improbable coincidence has occurred, there must exist a common
cause”.9 Thus for Reichenbach the search for causes underlying correlation
phenomena is a methodological maxim. Two comments however, regarding
the principle, are in order. First, by “improbable” Reichenbach does not
mean a coincidence between two token events with a low prior probability.
Rather what he has in mind is a statistical correlation between two event-
types A and B that is robust both theoretically and experimentally, i.e. (a)
that it is predicted by some established theory and (b) that it has been ver-
ified empirically, or at least not refuted by experiment. But it must also be
the case that the correlation between the event types can not be explained
as a mere direct causal relation between those types. The methodological
maxim to unearth common cause structure is not applicable for event types
that have already been explained by means of a direct causal connection:
those are not “improbable”.
Hence the first condition for causal inference, according to Reichenbach’s
theory, is correlation between two event types A and B which are not directly
causally related:
prob(A ∧B) 6= prob(A)prob(B) (Correlation)
The second condition is the existence of a open fork, i.e. a third vari-
able C representing an event type in the past of A and B that makes the
9(Reichenbach, 1956, pp. 157 ff).
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correlation between A and B vanish:10
prob(A ∧B|C) = prob(A|C)prob(B|C) (OpenFork)
This condition can be expressed in a mathematically equivalent way as
a screening off condition. If C, A, B form an open fork as described above,
then it follows that C screens off A from B and viceversa:11
prob(A|B ∧ C) = prob(A|C)
prob(B|A ∧ C) = prob(B|C) (Screening− off)
Reichenbach was very aware that we must tread carefully at this point,
since screening off is not a sufficient condition on common causes only a
necessary one, and that only under a very strong presumption of complete-
ness. Let me explain. To see that screening off is not sufficient for common
causes it is enough to observe that for any correlation, there will always
exist some variable D that is not common cause, but satisfies the screening
off condition, i.e some variable D such that:
prob(A ∧B|D) = prob(A|D)prob(B|D).
For example a common effectD lying in the future of A and B will screen
off A from B and viceversa (figure 2). These cases can be dispensed with by
means of the “in the common past of A and B” qualification, which rules
out a screener off in the future of either A or B. However, any common
effect D lying to the future of C but to the past of A and B will also satisfy
screening off (figure 3).
Hence screening off is not necessary for a common cause, unless we insist
on a very strong assumption of completeness: i.e. unless we assure ourselves
that C is the only causally relevant variable for A and B; but to know this
would be to know precisely what Reichenbach’s inferential techniques were
meant to allow us to learn in the first place – i.e. that C is the common
cause of A and B.
Thus causal inference for Reichenbach was to proceed negatively: by dis-
covering violations of the screening off condition. In other words screening
off was to be taken to be merely necessary for a common cause: Not all
screener offs are common causes but all common causes screen off. Hence,
10The qualification “in the past of A and B” is anachronistic, and very much my own.
Reichenbach thought that open forks could be used to define the direction of time, so to
say of an open fork that it is oriented towards the future (or, as I say above, that the
screener off must lie in the common past of A and B) would just amount, in Reichenbach’s
theory, to the trivial truism that an open fork is oriented as an open fork.
11And, conversely, if C screens off A from B, and C lies in the past of A and B, then
C, A, B form an open fork.
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roughly, if conditioning upon some variable C does not render A and B sta-
tistically independent then we can at least be sure that C is not the common
cause. Yet, even this simple statement does not turn out to be generally
true. To see why consider the following structure where two common causes
C and D acting independently underlie the correlation between A and B
(figure 4).
In this structure neither C nor D will screen off on their own. It is
instead the conjunction of C and D that makes the correlation vanish:
prob(A ∧B|C ∧D) = prob(A|C ∧D)prob(B|C ∧D).
Hence a violation of this condition, in a structure with these four vari-
ables only, allows us to safely infer that either C, or D, or both fail to be
common causes. A violation of the corresponding screening off conditions
for C and D disjointly would allow us to infer nothing safely at all about
C and D other than the very minimal conditional fact that if C (D) is
a common cause of A and B, then C (D) certainly is not the only cause.
And that again presupposes precisely some of the causal knowledge that
Reichenbach’s methods were supposed to allow us to discover.
Things actually get worse. The only piece of causal knowledge that
we can possibly discover on the basis of statistical analysis by means of
Reichenbach’s screening off condition turns out to be conditional once again
on a strong assumption of completeness. We concluded above that if the
conjunction of C andD fails to screen off A from B, then we can be sure that
9
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C ∧D is not the common cause, in a structure with four variables only. But
of course the same reasoning that led us to consider four instead of three
variables might well lead us now to consider five. Consider the following
structure (figure 5), with three putative common causes C, D and E of the
correlation between A and B. In this structure the conjunction of C and D
will not necessarily screen off A from B. We can only expect the conjunction
of D, C and E to do so. So the only violation of screening off that would
be informative about the actual causal structure would be:
prob(A ∧B|C ∧D ∧ E) 6= prob(A|C ∧D ∧ E)prob(B|C ∧D ∧ E).
But in turn this violation of the screening off condition will be infor-
mative about the actual causal structure, only in a structure with only five
variables A, B, C, D, E. Once again this implies a strong completeness con-
dition is in place for causal structure. So it requires us to know a fair amount
about the causal structure before we can apply Reichenbach’s methods in
order to discover any facts about the causal structure. And so on. By means
of these simple examples, we can already easily appreciate why one of the
often repeated main lessons of the recent literature on causal structure has
been the insight that there is no causal discovery without background causal
10
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knowledge: no causes in, no causes out. It is not possible to learn anything
regarding causal structure from knowledge of statistical correlations alone.
Additional causal knowledge is essential for informative inference from sta-
tistical correlations to causal hypotheses.
This is an insight that will turn out to be important for the rest of this
paper. Let me here quickly recapitulate its implications towards Reichen-
bach’s Principle of the Common Cause. Two different commitments are
often conflated under this rubric. On the one hand there is a commitment
to the general maxim: “if an improbable coincidence has occurred, there
must exist a common cause”. By itself this says nothing about whether
common causes necessarily screen off. Reichenbach’s second commitment is
that a common cause structure will satisfy screening off. This commitment
conversely seems to be independent of the first, since there could be unex-
plained correlations even if all common causes that do in fact exist screen
off.
Let us refer to these independent commitments as Reichenbach’s princi-
ple of the common cause, and Reichenbach’s criterion for common causes.
The principle is then the assertion that every well established correlation
must have causal explanation. This is a metaphysical statement regard-
ing the nature of correlations, lacking any methodological implications in
the absence of a more concrete algorithm for causal discovery. Reichen-
bach’s criterion on the other hand establishes that common causes neces-
sarily screen off. The criterion is supposed to provide the principle with
methodological bite, and to allow causal discovery to proceed on the basis
of statistical analysis. But as we have seen the form of the criterion that
seems sound already builds in causal knowledge from the start since it can
only establish that complete common causes screen off. This is the main
insight to be learnt from the preceding discussion in this section. However,
we should be clear that this insight only compromises Reichenbach’s crite-
rion. In and by itself the insight says nothing at all about Reichenbach’s
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metaphysical principle, which might well be true in spite of our failure to
find any grounds for causal discovery that would allow us to test it. In other
words, Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause does not stand or fall
with Reichenbach’s screening off criterion for common causes. The principle
might be true even if the criterion turns out to be flawed.
3 The Arguments against Causal Models
In this section I review what I consider to be the three outstanding ar-
guments against causal accounts of the EPR correlations, due to Bas Van
Fraassen, Daniel Hausman and Huw Price. In the subsequent sections I shall
attempt to rebut these arguments.
3.1 Van Fraassen’s Reichenbachian argument
The most influential argument against causal models for the EPR correla-
tions is due to Bas Van Fraassen. In a set of two overlapping papers in
the 1980’s Van Fraassen argued that the EPR correlations can not receive a
causal explanation in either the direct-cause or common cause varieties.12 It
would be difficult to overestimate the argument’s influence, even if it is not
always explicitly acknowledged. I believe that this argument is historically
the main source of many philosophers’ scepticism towards causal accounts
of the EPR correlations. Van Fraassen’s papers have also deeply influenced
the way philosophers of physics have come to analyse and understand the
nature of quantum non-locality and its possible conflict with relativistic
causation.13
Van Fraassen begins by establishing an analysis of the main statisti-
cal condition at the heart of Bell’s theorem (the notorious “factorizabil-
ity” condition) in terms of three distinct and independent conditions called
“causality”, “hidden locality” and “hidden autonomy”. Factorizability is a
necessary condition for deriving Bell’s inequalities, which almost everyone
agrees have been refuted by experiment.14 Van Fraassen takes this to im-
ply that it is an empirical fact that “factorizability” is false. It thus follows
12(van Fraassen, 1982, 1989).
13An instance is Jon Jarrett’s influential distinction between parameter and outcome
independence (Jarrett, 1984), which tracks Van Fraassen’s “causality” and “hidden local-
ity” conditions, and which has been widely adopted among philosophers of physics (for
an acute dissenting criticism of Jarrett’s conditions see (Maudlin, 1995, chapter 4).
14Not everyone agrees that Bell’s inequalities have been experimentally refuted. How-
ever, contrary to what some uninformed physicists seem to believe, philosophers have not
been at all prominent among those disputing the experimental results – on the contrary
philosophers of physics on the whole have shown at least as great, if not greater, a readi-
ness to accept the standard understanding of the experimental results as any physicists.
For some dissenting views among physicists see for instance Marshall, Santos and Selleri
(1983), Foad´ı and Selleri (2000).
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from his analysis that at least one of the three conditions that factorizability
can de decomposed into must necessarily be empirically false. His argument
purports to put the blame entirely on “causality”, which Van Fraassen then
takes both to imply that no causal model is viable for the EPR correlations,
and that Reichenbach’s principle of the common cause is false as a matter
of fact: not all well established correlations admit of a causal model.
Let us now look into this argument in greater detail. Van Fraassen
first aims to establish that the EPR correlations constitute an example of
“improbable coincidence” in Reichenbach’s sense. So he aims to show that
the measurement outcome event on each wing of the experiment can not
be directly causing the outcome event on the other wing. Let us suppose
that in the laboratory rest frame the measurement on particle “1” is carried
out before the measurement on particle “2”; in other words measurement
outcome s1 occurs before measurement outcome s2. A direct cause model
would be one in which the measurement outcome event in one wing, s1, is
a direct partial cause of the measurement outcome event in the other wing,
s2 (figure 6). This is just the kind of model that Van Fraassen aims first to
rule out:
“1”
“2”
“e”
“A1” “A2”
“s2”
“s1”
“3”
Figure 6.
In this spacetime representation of the EPR experiment A1 and A2 repre-
sent the worldlines of the measurement devices; “1” and “2” represent those
of the particles; and the line comprised between s1 and s2 is the worldline
of a direct causal process between the wings of the experiment. s1, s2, and
13
e denote event-types, where e is the particles’ emission event, and s1 and s2
are the outcome-events that result from measurements on particle “1” by
device A1, and on particle “2” by device A2, respectively. s2 is in addition
the reception event by particle “2” of the causal influence emitted by particle
“1”.
Van Fraassen rules out direct cause models by appealing to relativity
theory, since this theory implies that events s1 and s2, which lie outside each
others’ light cone, are not absolutely oriented in time. This entails, according
to Van Fraassen, that any direct causal model for the EPR correlations in
these circumstances could only provide an “explanation by coordination”:15
“By coordination I mean a correspondence effected by signals (in
a wide sense): some energy or matter travelling from one loca-
tion to another, and acting as a partial producing factor for the
corresponding event. The situation need not be deterministic –
there can be indeterministic signalling if the signal is not certain
to arrive and/or not certain to have the required effect. But the
word “travel” must be taken seriously. Hence this explanation
cannot work for corresponding events with spacelike separation.
To speak of instantaneous travel from X to Y is a mixed or in-
coherent metaphor, for the entity in question is implied to be
simultaneously at X and at Y – in which case there is no need
for travel, as it is at its destination already.”
In other words special relativity entails that there exists some frame of
reference, equally valid for the description of the physical facts, where the
emission of the causal influence is simultaneous with its reception (figure 7).
In this frame of reference the material process that transmits the causal
influence must travel at an infinite speed, which raises Van Fraassen’s ques-
tion regarding the inappropriate use of the word “travel” in this context.
This part of Van Fraassen’s argument is controversial (see section 4) but
let us accept it here for the sake of argument. Let us then suppose for the
sake of argument that a direct-cause model for the EPR correlations is im-
possible. This would indeed mean that the EPR correlations are precisely a
case of Reichenbach’s “improbable coincidence” and thus, if Reichenbach’s
principle is to hold, require a common cause explanation.
As has already been noted a common cause model for the EPR correla-
tions is precluded, according to Van Fraassen, by the experimental violation
of Bell’s inequalities. His analysis starts from a consideration of the so-called
“factorizability” condition that lies at the heart of the Bell inequalities:
prob(s1 ∧ s2|a ∧ b ∧Ψ) = prob(s1|a ∧Ψ)prob(s2|b ∧Ψ) (FACT)
15(van Fraassen, 1982, in 1989, p. 112).
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Factorizability has sometimes been identified with a condition of phys-
ical locality, but this is nowadays considered a very contentious identifica-
tion, so I will stick to the more neutral terminology in this paper.16 Van
Fraassen shows that this condition is the conjunction of three distinct sta-
tistical conditions, which he calls “causality”, “hidden locality” and “hidden
autonomy”:
prob(s1|s2 ∧ a ∧ b ∧Ψ) = prob(s1|a ∧ b ∧Ψ)
prob(s2|s1 ∧ a ∧ b ∧Ψ) = prob(s2|a ∧ b ∧Ψ) (Causality)
This condition is a straightforward application of Reichenbach’s screen-
ing off criterion for common causes, which Van Fraassen adopts. It states
that the conjoint event (a ∧ b ∧ Ψ) makes event s2 statistically irrelevant
to the probability of s1, and viceversa. It has already been noted that ac-
cording to Reichenbach’s criterion, screening off is a necessary condition on
a common cause. Thus Reichenbach’s criterion implies the following condi-
tional: if (Causality) is false in the EPR experiment then the conjunction
(a ∧ b ∧Ψ) can not be a common cause of the correlations.
The second condition, “hidden locality”, is also an application of the
16Some philosophers (as well as physicists) have contested that the experimental refuta-
tion of Bell’s inequalities entails the existence of physical “non-locality”. But on the whole
philosophers accept that (FACT) has been violated by experiment. They just question
that (FACT) can be identified in any straightforward way with a condition of physical
locality (see most prominently, (Fine, 1982)).
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screening off condition. It states, for each wing of the experiment, that the
conjunction of the creation event at the source and the corresponding setting
event at one wing together screen off the outcome event at that wing from
the setting event at the distant wing:
prob(s1|a ∧ b ∧Ψ) = prob(s1|a ∧Ψ)
prob(s2|a ∧ b ∧Ψ) = prob(s2|b ∧Ψ) (Hidden Locality)
The conjunction of (Causality) and (Hidden Locality) is sufficient for
factorizability. The proof is trivial and begins with the observation that it
is generally the case that:
prob(s1 ∧ s2|a ∧ b ∧Ψ) = prob(s1|s2 ∧ a ∧ b ∧Ψ)prob(s2|a ∧ b ∧Ψ).
By (Causality) it follows that:
prob(s1 ∧ s2|a ∧ b ∧Ψ) = prob(s1|a ∧ b ∧Ψ)prob(s2|a ∧ b ∧Ψ)
And by (Hidden Locality) we obtain factorizability (FACT):
prob(s1 ∧ s2|a ∧ b ∧Ψ) = prob(s1|a ∧Ψ)prob(s2|b ∧Ψ)
It then seems surprising that Van Fraassen invokes a third condition,
namely “hidden autonomy”, which guarantees that the state at the source
is statistically independent of the apparatus setting-events:
prob(Ψ|a ∧ b) = prob(Ψ) (HiddenAutonomy)
This condition establishes that the probability of the particles to be
in a particular state Ψ at the time of their emission is independent of the
selection of the setting-events in either wing. Note first that were a violation
of this condition to entail a causal influence it would necessarily entail an
influence backwards in time in the rest frame of the laboratory since in
that frame the source event is prior to any of the setting events. (Hidden
Autonomy) can be appealed to in this analysis for a couple of reasons. The
first is simply that it is necessary for (FACT), just like the others. That
is (Causality) and (Hidden Locality) are each entailed by (FACT) but so
is (Hidden Autonomy). On the other hand it is clear that a violation of
(Hidden autonomy) must in turn entail that either (Causality) or (Hidden
Locality) is false since otherwise, given what we just proved above, (FACT)
would hold – even if ex hypothesis (Hidden Autonomy) is false. The most
natural culprit is (Hidden Locality): if the state statistically depends on the
settings, then it seems that the outcomes – which in turn depend on the
state – must statistically depend on the settings. This is the second and
most important reason to include (Hidden Autonomy) explicitly among the
conditions: There is an interesting case of failure of (Hidden Locality), and
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consequently of (FACT), that turns on a violation of (Hidden Autonomy).
And it is precisely this interesting case that will become relevant later on in
assessing another argument against causality in quantum physics, namely
the argument due to Huw Price.
Thus we have established, following Van Fraassen’s analysis, that the
violation of the Bell inequalities requires that at least one among (Causality),
(Hidden Locality) and (Hidden Autonomy) be false. Van Fraassen then goes
to argue that the EPR correlations themselves show (Causality) to be false.
This is because the state of the particles at the time of their emission does
not screen off the outcome-events from each other. For, let us suppose that
a = b = θ, without loss of generality. Then (Causality) reduces to:
prob(s1|s2 ∧Ψ) = prob(s1|Ψ)
prob(s2|s1 ∧Ψ) = prob(s2|Ψ)
And this condition is certainly false, since according to quantum me-
chanics:
prob(s1|s2 ∧Ψ) = 1 6= prob(s1|Ψ) = 12
prob(s2|s1 ∧Ψ) = 1 6= prob(s2|Ψ) = 12
Van Fraassen thus concludes that a common cause model for EPR of
the sort envisioned by Reichenbach is not viable: “The conclusion is surely
inevitable: there are well attested phenomena which cannot be embedded
in any common-cause model.” (van Fraassen, 1982, in 1989, p. 108).
3.2 Hausman’s Independence Argument
A different argument against causal accounts of the EPR correlations has
been provided by Daniel Hausman, who aims to reproduce Van Fraassen’s
negative conclusion by applying his own distinct theory of causation. At
the heart of Hausman’s theory there are a couple of anti-Humean princi-
ples. The first one, partly inspired by Reichenbach, exerts the connection
between causes and probabilities dependencies, and Hausman refers to it as
the Necessary Connection Principle (N-Connection or NC Principle):17
N-Connection Principle (NC): Events a and b are n-connected if and only if
they are distinct and (1) a causes b or b causes a or (2) a and b are effects
of a common cause.
The relationship between (NC) and Reichenbach’s principle of the com-
mon cause is, according to Hausman, akin to the relation between tokens and
17(Hausman, 1999, p. 81). For Hausman’s own theory of causation see also (Hausman,
1998) where the (NC) principle appears as “The Connection Principle”.
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types of causally related events. The (NC) principle applies to token events,
and Hausman defends the view that this relation manifests itself as the kind
of probabilistic dependence (correlation) among types that prompts Reichen-
bach’s principle.18 Another important point of clarification regarding this
definition has to do with the notion of “distinctness”. For Hausman, two
events are distinct if they are neither logically related nor do they have any
part in common. Thus Hausman’s definition unpacks some of the commit-
ments underlying Reichenbach’s notion of “improbable coincidence” among
event types. Finally it is important to note that to have wide application,
the (NC) principle must be relativised to some causal “field”, otherwise the
principle would hold trivially for all events in relation to the big bang.19
The (NC) principle is in essence just an anti-Humean assertion of cau-
sation as an independent relation between token events which might give
rise to and explain, but must not be confused with, probabilistic associa-
tion among the corresponding types. The most distinct among Hausman’s
tenets, which identifies his theory, is another principle. The independence
condition asserts that every effect must have a distinct and individual cause,
unrelated to all its other causes (hence often represented by an exogenous
variable), which in principle at least allows us to fix its value independently.
I will in this paper call such distinct and individual causes a “handle” or
“leverer”, since at least in principle they allow us to control the presence of
token effects and the corresponding probability of their associated types:
Independence Condition (I): If a causes b or a and b are n-connected only
as effects of some common cause, then b has a cause that is distinct from a
and not n-connected to a.
Hausman claims that (I) is a conceptual truth about causation: “a
boundary condition on the possibility of causal attributions” (1999, p. 83);
“a necessary condition for the possibility of causal attributions and causal
explanations” (1998, p. 64); and “when all the same things have an n-
connection to a and b, causal concepts are inapplicable” (1999, p. 83). The
intuition is that causal concepts are inapplicable to cases that do not satisfy
(I). Prominent among these are putative cases of singular proximate causes.
Hence Hausman is ruling out the standard understanding of, for instance,
radioactive decay – according to which the nuclear structure of the radioac-
tive element is itself the sole and proximate cause of its decay with a certain
probability. He states in response to this putative counterexample to (I)
that “the phenomena that we identify as causes and effects are not at all
like this” (1998, p. 69). The view that I will defend on the contrary is that
the EPR correlations precisely show that we are quite prepared to entertain
a causal relation that ascribes to an effect a sole and proximate cause.
18(Hausman, 1998, p. 59).
19(Hausman, 1999, p. 81; 1998, p. 40 and p. 60).
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Together with an assumption of transitivity of causation (i.e. if c is
caused by b and b is caused by a then c is caused by a), (NC) and (I) jointly
entail the following “theory of causation”:
Independence Theory of Causation (C): a causes b if and only if (i) a is
n-connected to b, (ii) everything n-connected to a and distinct from b is n-
connected to b, and (iii) something n-connected to b is causally independent
of a.
The notion of causal independence that Hausman appeals to here is a
straightforward application of the other terms already defined in his theory:
“I shall say that events are causally independent if and only if they are both
distinct and not causally connected [i.e. n-connected]” (1998, section 4.4).
Thus substituting our prior definitions we obtain the following paraphrase
of the (C)’s main implication: We can only meaningfully claim that some
token event a is the cause of some other event b if 1) a and b are distinct
events 2) causally connected to each other by either 3i) directly causing each
other or 3ii) as effects of some common cause, and 4) such that all causes
and effects of a are also causes or effects of b, while 5) b has at least one cause
or effect that is neither cause nor effect of a. It is worth noting that each
commitment in (C) essentially responds to either (NC), (I) or transitivity.
Thus (NC) is essentially responsible for 1), 2) and 3); transitivity applied
to (NC) yields 4); while condition 5) is essentially the result of applying the
independence condition (I).
We may now return to Hausman’s analysis of the EPR correlations. An
application of (C) to EPR yields the conclusion that the measurement wing
on one wing can not be said to be the cause of the measurement event in
the other wing (see figures 1 and 6).20 The reason is that condition (5) is
apparently violated: in other words the independence condition (I) fails. To
check this claim in an EPR background, we must first translate condition
(I) into that setting, as follows:
Independence Condition for EPR (I for EPR) : If s1 causes s2 or s1 and s2
are n-connected only as effects of some common cause, then s2 has a cause
that is distinct from s1 and not n-connected to s1.
20Hausman’s most detailed analysis appeals instead to the so-called GHZ experiment,
which requires a smaller range of setting-events in order to generate the contradiction
with a Bell-like inequality. But as far as I can see this is an unnecessary complication
and detour since the reason why Hausman thinks that no causal model will apply to GHZ
is exactly the same that leads him to the same scepticism in the EPR case, namely the
failure of the independence (I) condition as described above (Hausman, 1999, p. 86). And
my proposal in section 5 of the applicability of (I) to some possible causal models of EPR
applies mutatis mutandis to causal models for GHZ.
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A straightforward application of this condition to the simplest common-
cause model – with causal influences travelling along the particles’ world-
lines, and the setting events rendered irrelevant by setting them both in the
same direction θ, as in figure 1 – illustrates nicely the failure of (I) that
Hausman alludes to. In that scenario there is no event that is a cause of s2
that is not also n-connected to s1. In other words there is no independent
“handle” on s2 that would allow us to control its value independently of the
causal relation between s1 and s2. The failure of (I for EPR) entails, accord-
ing to Hausman, that causal concepts are inapplicable in this scenario: our
putative common cause model for EPR is not a genuinely causal model.21
3.3 Huw Price’s Asymmetry Argument
Yet another argument against causal models for the EPR correlations is
due to Huw Price.22 Price’s views are close to Hausman’s in the following
regard:23 both seem to think that even if models for the EPR correlations
may look causal, they nonetheless fail to be genuinely causal – since they
do not employ fully articulate causal concepts. But they differ as to what
they consider the key to a full articulation of the concept of causality. And
they correspondingly differ in their analysis of what is lacking in putative
causal models for the EPR correlations. For Hausman, as was noted in the
previous section, the key is the failure of the Independence (I) condition,
while for Price the key is the absence of a time-asymmetry in the relation
of causal dependence.
It might seem odd to include Price in the list of critics of causal models,
since he is well known for defending an explanation of the EPR correlations
along the lines of the zigzag model of Costa de Beauregard, employing the
notion of backwards in time influences; and this is often understood to be
a causal model. In my view Price’s theses on causal asymmetry make it
explicit that his conception of causation does not really fit a causal under-
standing of such backwards-in-time explanations of the EPR correlations.
And his most recent defense of causal perspectivalism makes it plain that
for him the notion of causation is unsuitable for microphysics altogether.24
Hence the conclusion to be extracted is that the kind of explanation that
Price is advocating for EPR correlations is not, on his own account, gen-
uinely causal.
21Hausman then goes on to devote a fair amount of work to provide a revised version
of the (NC) principle that accommodates the existence of nomological but non-causal
correlations of the sort that he finds in EPR (Hausman, 1999, pp. 88ff.); but this is
irrelevant to our purposes here, since the failure of (I) still impugns the application of his
theory of causation (C) to the EPR correlations.
22(Price, 1996, chapters 7-9).
23Or rather “Hausman’s views are close to Price’s”, since Price’s work in this area
precedes Hausman’s.
24(Price, 2005).
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The type of model advocated by Price for the EPR correlations can be
represented in a spacetime diagram of the sort that we have been employing
as follows:
“c”
“a”
“A1” “A2”
“b”
“s1”
“s2”
Figure 8.
In this model the setting events influence the creation event at the source.
(The continuous arrows represent causal influences; the discontinuous ar-
rows by contrast represent “influences” that need not be considered causal).
They partly determine the state of the particle pair at the source. Hence
the state of the particles by the time they reach their corresponding mea-
surement devices is not the singlet state but the corresponding mixture over
the possible values of spin in the direction selected by the settings. This
explains causally the manifestation of both values of spin at the measure-
ment outcome-events, and yields the appropriate statistical correlation over
a large number of similarly prepared particles. And the model has the great
advantage of being local, in the sense specified by both contiguity and rel-
ativity theory. All influences are transmitted by continuous worldlines in
spacetime, and between events lying within the relativistic light cones (the
arrows back from the setting events can be made to point as far back in the
past of the creation event as we like – and thus can be pushed back into the
shared part of the past lightcones of s1 and s2).
Yet the model has some apparent counterintuitive features from the point
of view of our ordinary experience of the macroscopic world. Since in a
typical EPR experiment the setting events a and b take place after the
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creation event c in the rest frame of the laboratory, it follows that were
this influence causal it would constitute an instance of backwards-in-time
causation. But Price does not characterise it this way, preferring instead
to refer to a backwards-in-time influence; and he defends this model as
an instance of a time-symmetric explanation of physical phenomena that
violates the microscopic innocence (µ-innocence) principle.
µ-innocence establishes that the states of systems in microphysics record
all their past interactions but none of their future ones.25 So that the states
of systems that have interacted in the past might well be entangled, but
not so the states of systems that will interact in the future. In other words
systems are innocent of any interactions that lie in their future, which can
have no effect upon their present state. The corresponding principle ap-
plied to macroscopic phenomena (the macroscopic innocence principle) is
of course intuitive, given the arrow of entropy defined by the second law
of thermodynamics – so intuitive in fact that Price thinks that it is rarely
made explicit. But it is not appropriate for microphysics, according to Price,
since it is in open conflict with the time-symmetry of the equations of fun-
damental physics: “There really is a conflict in the intuitive picture of the
world with which contemporary physics operates. [. . . ] Our intuitive com-
mmitement to µ-innocence is incompatible with T-symmetry” (Price, 1996,
p. 123). Given the time-reversal invariance of the fundamental laws of mi-
crophysics, Price rejects µ-innocence, and finds support for his rejection in
the backwards-in-time influences model in figure 7.
But it is important to note that for Price µ-innocence is not a principle
of causation, and the arrow of time that it defines does not thereby provide
the required asymmetry of causation. It is rather the other way round: the
reason we find µ-innocence intuitive in general is grounded upon our causal
perspective upon the (macroscopic) world. Price adopts an agency based
theory of causation, roughly: a causes b if and only if some agent can bring
about b by producing a. Since, according to Price, agents are macroscopic
creatures acting in the macroscopic world it follows from the time-oriented
character of macroscopic phenomena that causes precede their effects, by
definition.
So it is in a way misleading, according to Price, to refer to the model
in figure 7 as a “backwards causation” model. For Price the idea of back-
wards causation only makes sense as a projection from our ordinary forward-
oriented causal perspective of the macroworld. Price defends a model of this
sort for the EPR correlations as the only type of model that preserves lo-
cality and a nearly fully classical understanding of the quantum world; but
far from defending this as a causal model for the EPR correlations, he uses
it precisely to show the limits of the causal perspective. The model shows
25(Price, 1996, pp. 120ff).
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that the causal concepts that are properly employed to describe our experi-
ence of the macroscopic world, do not ultimately reflect any real properties
of the physical world itself. These concepts are not properly applicable to
the fundamental description of the processes underlying quantum correla-
tion phenomena. Thus Price ends up embracing the same type of scepticism
regarding causal accounts of the EPR correlations, and of quantum phenom-
ena in general, as we have seen defended by Hausman and Van Fraassen.
4 Five Causal Models for the EPR Correlations
In this section I describe five different causal models, and I argue that they
have not been refuted by any experimental results or theoretical considera-
tions. (In the next section I will argue that several of these models are in no
way compromised by the philosophical arguments previously reviewed). The
first model is a more general version of the direct-cause model of figure 6.
“c”
“a”
“A1” “A2”
“b”
“x”“3”
“1”
“2”
“s2”
“s1”
Figure 9: Causal Model I (Direct Cause)
In this model, unlike the model represented in figure 6, the causal influ-
ence does not “travel” directly from event s1 to event s2, but it is assumed
instead for the sake of generality that s1 is the cause of some change x in
the state of particle “2” on its way towards the distant wing. This event x is
in turn a partial cause of the subsequent spin measurement outcome event
on that particle, s2. I have argued elsewhere that this model is not actually
ruled out by relativity theory, contrary to what some philosophers, including
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Van Fraassen, have sometimes thought in the past. On the contrary there
are at least three different readings of this model that allow it to successfully
overcome any potential conflict with the theory of special relativity: an ac-
count of causal influence that does not require the transmission of energy or
mass, such as a counterfactual account; an account in terms of hypothetical
physical entities with superluminal velocities (tachyons); or an account that
fixes a privileged frame of reference and abandons Lorentz invariance.26 I
will not rehearse these accounts here but will just reiterate that they remain
experimentally and theoretically viable; so however controversial, Causal
Model I remains a live option.
Hence it is not clear that, on Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common
Cause, the EPR correlations are a case of improbable coincidence that re-
quires explanation by means of common causes; for as we saw in section 2
correlations between directly causally implicated events are not “improba-
ble coincidences” on Reichenbach’s definition. But let us go along with Van
Fraassen in supposing so. We must then notice that Van Fraassen’s argu-
ment requires Reichenbach’s principle but also what in section 2 I referred
to as Reichenbach’s criterion. Van Fraassen assumes that a Reichenbachian
analysis of causation requires that correlations be explained by causal mod-
els and also that common causes necessarily screen off. But in the recent
literature on causal inference the criterion has turned into an enormously
controversial assumption, which is tightly related to the controversy regard-
ing the causal Markov condition and its applicability to indeterministic phe-
nomena.27 I will not rehearse the debate here, but only mention that a
straightforward non-screening off common cause model remains viable for
the EPR correlations (figure 10).
In a common cause model of this sort the condition (Causality) need not
generally hold:
prob(s1|s2 ∧ a ∧ b ∧ c) 6= prob(s1|a ∧ b ∧ c)
prob(s2|s1 ∧ a ∧ b ∧ c) 6= prob(s2|a ∧ b ∧ c)
Nor does it need to hold in the particular case where the settings a and
b are fixed to the same value and thus rendered irrelevant:
prob(s1|s2 ∧ c) 6= prob(s1|c)
prob(s2|s1 ∧ c) 6= prob(s2|c)
Other common cause models are possible.28 For instance, a model is
possible where the common cause is not c, the emission event at the source,
26For the details see (Sua´rez, 2004). These issues are admirably treated in (Maudlin,
1995, chapter 5).
27(Hausman and Woodward, 1999), (Cartwright, 2000), (Hofer-Szabo´, Re´dei and Szabo´,
1999).
28(Sua´rez, 2004).
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“c”
“a”
“A1” “A2”
“b”
“s1”
“s2”
“2”
“1”
Figure 10: Causal Model II (Common Cause).
but some prior event, d. Indeed the common cause structure underlying the
EPR correlations could be quite complex (figure 11).
In this causal structure: d is the partial common cause of c, but might
also be a partial cause of a, b, s1, s2; c is the partial common cause of s1, s2;
a is the partial cause of s1; b is the partial cause of s2. The continuous lines
represent causal influence, while the discontinuous lines represent possible
causal influence. Thus the figure captures not just one, but a whole family
of causal models. Individually taken, these “common causes” can not be
expected to screen off their effects, on pain of a violation of factorizability.
That is:
prob(s1 ∧ s2|c) 6= prob(s1|c)prob(s2|c)
prob(s1 ∧ s2|d) 6= prob(s1|d)prob(s2|d)
However, the conjunction of both c and d might (although it need not)
satisfy factorizability:
prob(s1 ∧ s2|a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d) = prob(s1|a ∧ c ∧ d)prob(s2|b ∧ c ∧ d).
In this case the failure of factorizability with respect to the initial state
that yields the experimental violation of Bell’s inequalities might well be just
the result of focusing our attention on a small part of the complex whole
common cause structure.
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“c”
“a”
“b”
“A1” “A2”
“d”
“s1”
“s2”
Figure 11: Causal Model III (Complex Common Cause).
Yet another possibility is a model where the common cause is not a
discrete event but a whole part of a spacelike hypersurface with a value of
the time parameter prior to the measurement events in both wings – we
might for instance consider the hypersurface that includes the last setting
event in the laboratory rest frame29 (figure 12).
Other, more nuanced possibilities emerge once we realise that there is no
real threat from relativity theory. For instance, a model becomes possible
for the EPR correlations where the failure of factorizability is due to a failure
of (Hidden Locality) rather than (Causality) as in (figure 13).
In this model a setting-event in one wing is a partial cause of the out-
come-event in the opposite wing, so (Hidden Locality) is false:
prob(s1|a ∧ b ∧Ψ) 6= prob(s1|a ∧Ψ)
prob(s2|a ∧ b ∧Ψ) 6= prob(s2|b ∧Ψ)
Yet the model is compatible with Reichenbach’s criterion for common
causes, since (Causality) might well be satisfied, while keeping with the
empirical predictions of quantum mechanics:
prob(s1|s2 ∧ a ∧ b ∧ c) = prob(s1|a ∧ b ∧ c)
prob(s2|s1 ∧ a ∧ b ∧ c) = prob(s2|a ∧ b ∧ c)
29Some of these space-time options are described in (Butterfield, 1989).
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“a”
“A1” “A2”
“b”
“s2”
“s1” “c”
Figure 12: Causal Model IV (Hypersurface common Cause).
Finally, we must recall the type of model advocated by Huw Price, pre-
sented in section 3.3. In this model (regardless of whether we call the back-
wards influences causal or not) the (Hidden Autonomy) condition is violated,
since the initial state of the particles at the source is statistically dependent
upon the setting events, i.e.:
prob(Ψ|a ∧ b) 6= prob(Ψ)
In a thoroughly causal reading of this model (in contrast to Price’s own
non-causal reading), the setting-event in any of the wings is a partial cause
of the state of the particles as they are emitted at the source – an earlier
event in the laboratory frame:
The differences between this model and the one presented in section 3.3
(figure 8) are twofold. First, this model makes it the case that the influences
from the settings to the creation event are causal in nature (therefore rep-
resented as continuous lines); so we are indeed assuming a case of genuine
backwards causation. Second, we are assuming for the sake of generality
that these events’ influence upon c, the creation event at the source, is in-
direct and goes via a previous cause of this state d. This both provides the
model with full generality and represents the fact, announced in section 3
3, that the model need in no way conflict with any intuitions from relativity
theory, under any interpretation of the special theory, since all transmission
of causal influence can be infraluminal, including the causal influence of the
setting events upon the creation event at the source.
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“a”
“A1” “A2”
“b”
“s2”
“s1”
“c”
Figure 13: Causal Model V (Hidden Non-Locality).
5 Replies to the Arguments
I am now in a position to state and defend the main claim of this paper: The
arguments so far advanced against causal models for the EPR correlations all
include unwarranted assumptions and premises, and their scepticism about
quantum causation is premature. But before showing this in detail, let me
advance a disclaimer: I am not defending the view that causal concepts are
necessary or compulsory in the description of empirical phenomena. I am
not even defending the view that there is a causal model underlying the
quantum correlations; on the issue of causation in quantum mechanics (and
elsewhere in physics) the position adopted in this paper will be a thoroughly
pragmatist one instead.30
The starting point is that Price’s pragmatism does not go far enough in
30In other words I oppose Nancy Cartwright’s causal fundamentalism just as much
as I oppose Van Fraassen’s causal scepticism. Instead I adopt, here and elsewhere, the
particularism and quietism of Arthur Fine’s NOA. The present paper is yet another NOA-
driven exercise in my career: It presupposes that whether or not causality can be applied
to the EPR correlations depends greatly on the details of the theory of causation employed,
and on those of the particular model of the EPR correlations adopted. And there is no
point attempting to answer the question in the abstract, independently of such details. For
Fine’s criticisms of Cartwright’s causal fundamentalism see (Fine, 1991). My own criticism
of Cartwright’s causal fundamentalism is (Sua´rez, 2002) – a paper that is regrettably
still in press four years after it was written! I also share Price’s sceptical comments on
Cartwright’s causal fundamentalism (Price, 2005, section 10).
28
“A2”“A1”
“a”
“b”
“s2”
“s1”
“c”
“d”
Figure 14: Causal Model VI (Hidden Non-Autonomy).
relation to causation: for the pragmatist the causal perspective ought to be
a pragmatic option, which we might choose to adopt for particular purposes
of explanation, prediction or coherence. So unlike Price, I will not take the
causal perspective to be compulsory in macrophysics, but neither will I see
it as incompatible with microphysics. Causal models can be made available
for virtually any correlation phenomena. Provided that the completeness
assumption discussed in section 2 is rejected (and provided enough imagina-
tion!) any causal structure can be suitably expanded to provide some causal
model for any correlation phenomena, including the EPR correlations. We
are not compelled to accept any of these models (and we might be forced to
reject some of them on empirical grounds) but we are at freedom to adopt
any of those not ruled out by the physics if we wish for pragmatic purposes.
The models discussed in the previous section are all permitted by the
physics, and we are therefore at freedom to adopt any of them on pragmatic
grounds. These models are very helpful in displaying the unwarranted pre-
suppositions and premises in the arguments, reviewed in section 3, against
causal accounts for the EPR correlations. I will discuss each set of arguments
against these models one by one.
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5.1 Reply to Van Fraassen’s Reichenbachian arguments
Causal model I shows that Van Fraassen’s relativistic argument against
direct-cause models is too harsh. The issues are threefold. First, it is un-
clear whether the concept of “travelling” is at all appropriate for this type of
model there are accounts of causal influence that do not require any material
object travelling from cause to effect. Second, the existence of superlumi-
nal entities (tachyons), albeit controversial, has not been ruled out yet by
the physics. Third, it is always possible that the EPR experiment fixes a
privileged frame of reference (other interpretations of quantum mechanics
do too, notably Bohm’s), in which case there is no issue of “infinite speed”
travelling and the concept “travel” may apply fully. Since causal model I
remains viable under any of these options, Van Fraassen’s brief argument
against superluminal causation models is inconclusive.
Causal model II shows that Van Fraassen’s assumption of Reichenbach’s
criterion, in addition to Reichenbach’s principle, is problematic too. Van
Fraassen conflates principle and criterion, but twenty years on these two
commitments seem clearly distinct. For there is now a large body of litera-
ture on the topic of causal inference that finds the criterion deeply contro-
versial while agreeing fully with the principle.31 Moreover model II is not
ruled out by the physics. First the causal influences in the model are all
infraluminal, so no relativistic issues arise. Second, since the common cause
does not screen off, (Causality) will not hold in this causal model, and the
failure of factorizability that gives rise to the violation of Bell’s inequalities
can be accommodated in a straightforward and simple way.
Causal model III shows that the failure of (FACT) with respect to the
creation event at the source (or more generally, the quantum state of the par-
ticle pair) can in principle be accommodated within a larger common cause
structure. Moreover this larger structure might even satisfy Reichenbach’s
criterion, not just his principle. Again the physics does not yet rule this
out, although no credible candidates for the deeper common cause structure
have been suggested to date.
Finally, models V and VI show that Van Fraassen is too rashly blaming
the failure of factorizability upon (Causality) alone. (Hidden Locality) could
be the culprit instead, and this would be so in a causal model in which the
31And since the criterion is controversial, the strongest defence today of the principle
will abandon the criterion altogether. Thus the strongest defence of the principle of
common cause takes it that common causes do not generally screen off. For a defence of
this point of view see (Cartwright, 1988; Cartwright, 1989). Although I am adopting the
principle for the purposes of this paper, I am aware of possible limitations – such as Sober’s
well known argument against the application of the principle to arbitrary monotonically
increasing time series. Sober’s argument is not relevant to the present discussion because
the EPR correlations are not correlations between time-series, and his rejection of the
principle in general is consistent with my adoption of it for the purposes of this paper.
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setting events in one wing are causes, either directly of the measurement
outcome events in the distant wing or indirectly via the common cause. The
latter case is a particularly interesting case of failure of (Hidden Locality)
since it also entails the failure of (Hidden Autonomy) and requires backwards
causation. Model V by contrast does not entail backwards causation in the
laboratory rest frame, but the relativistic considerations must once again be
addressed. But neither case is precluded by the physics itself.
Hence Van Fraassen’s argument contains three sets of pressuppositions
that require far more discussion that has been provided in the philosophy of
quantum mechanics literature so far. First, it is in no way automatic that
relativity rules out any of these causal models. Second, it seems at least
necessary to distinguish between Reichenbach’s principle and Reichenbach’s
criterion and to discuss their implications for each of these models. Third,
it seems premature to put the blame for the failure of factorizability solely
upon the (Causality) condition. I am suggesting here that there are definite
avenues for defending that the models are not ruled out by relativity, that
they might conflict with Reichenbach’s criterion but not with his principle,
and that it might well be the case that (Hidden Non-Locality) and not (Non-
Causality) is to be blamed for the failure of factorizability in some of these
causal models.
5.2 Reply to Hausman’s independence argument
Let us now turn to Daniel Hausman’s argument, reviewed in section 3.2.
Hausman claims that the independence condition fails in general in quantum
mechanics, and hence the quantum mechanical correlations are an exception
to his theory of causation (C): they are established law-like correlations that
can not be given a causal explanation. I believe the argument is mistaken
on two grounds. First, I will argue that there are causal models for the
EPR correlations that obey Hausman’s independence (I) condition.32 This
might look like good news for Hausman, since it points out that some of
these models are amenable to his theory; if so quantum mechanics is not
the exception to his theory that he has taken it to be. But secondly, I will
argue that at least some of the causal models for the EPR correlations are
not amenable to this type of treatment. In these models the independence
condition fails. However, the models are clearly causal, or at least they have
been taken as such by virtually anyone in the literature. Hence, regrettably
for Hausman’s theory, causal concepts have been applied to situations that
Hausman’s theory rules out as non-causal. My conclusion will therefore be
that Hausman’s theory does not capture all conceptual truths about causa-
tion. If this is correct then, contrary to what he claims, the independence
32I conjecture that these models can be extended in a straightforward manner to cover
the GHZ correlations.
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condition (I) can not a conceptual truth about causation.
I mantain that model II satisfies Hausman’s theory of causality, includ-
ing the independence assumption (I). The contrast is clearest with model
IV which having a similar structure, nonetheless fails to satisfy Hausman’s
independence condition (I). In model II the creation event at the source “c”
is the common cause of both measurement outcome events s1 and s2. We al-
ready noticed in section 3.2 that in this scenario the independence condition
becomes:
Independence Condition for EPR (I for EPR) : If s1 causes s2 or s1 and s2
are n-connected only as effects of some common cause, then s2 has a cause
that is distinct from s1 and not n-connected to s1.
This condition is satisfied because b is a cause of s2, distinct from s1,
and not n-connected to s1. The condition can be conversely applied to s1
in relation to s2, with a as the independent cause of s1. It is important to
notice how the setting events a, b are genuine independent causes, that can
be used to affect the values of s1 and s2. We can choose the setting events as
late as we like. Suppose that event s1 takes place first, then we can choose
at a later setting event b the orientation of the magnetometer that we desire,
therefore fixing the decomposition of the singlet state for that particle, and
the corresponding probabilities. Since the measurement event outcomes are
just one of two (plus or minus) we effectively alter the probability of each
possible outcome. On any probabilistic theory of causation c is a cause of
e if c’s occurrence changes the value of the probability of e. Thus each of
the causally related events s1 and s2 have their own “leverers” or “handles”
that can help to fix the probability for their values independently, namely
the setting events a, b in their respective wings.
There is a crucial difference between model II and the specific scenario
that I described in section 3.2 as an illustration of Hausman’s theory. In
that scenario all the settings are fixed in advance, so there is no “handle”
ex hypothesis. But in the scenario described by model II there is a well
defined handle on the effect’s wing for any setting and outcome event on the
distant wing. True, an agent can make use of this “handle” to bring about
differences in the probabilities as desired only if he or she has full information
regarding the setting and outcome on the distant wing. However, the notion
of “handle” presupposed by Hausman is ontological, and unaffected by the
lack of knowledge of a particular situated agent, so this fact is irrelevant to
the causal nature of model II.
The independence condition fails, by contrast, in model IV, even if this
model has a very similar common cause structure. The main difference is
that in model IV the common cause is a complete hypersurface of spacetime
that contains b and (all the effects of) a. So it is impossible in this model to
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control the value of a and b independently of the common cause c itself. In-
dependence fails here because there is no cause of s2 that is not n-connected
to s1. So, according to Hausman’s theory model IV is not a genuine causal
model.
Then there are versions of model I that satisfy Hausman’s conditions
too, and are thus fully causal under his own theory. For instance, take the
version of model I discussed by Van Fraassen (figure 6), where the event s1
is a direct partial cause of the event s2. In this model the causal influence
takes some time to reach s2 since this event occurs some time after its
cause s1. Now any setting event b on the mesuring device in the wing of
the experiment of particle “2” that takes place after event s1 will also be an
effective leverer or handle for s2, just as previously discussed. In the absence
of any setting events, however (or if the settings have been preordained to
be the same well before the experiment is run) the model will too fail to
satisfy the independence condition. In the more general kind of model I
described in figure 9, the causal relation between the intermediate event x
and its partial effect s2 on that wing will satisfy independence, but not so
the causal relation between s1 and x.
Similarly some versions of model III comply with independence, while
others do not. A version of model III with continuous arrows between the
deeper common cause d and the measurement outcome events s1 and s2,
and between d and the setting events a and b will not satisfy independence,
as in this model every cause of s1 is n-connected to every cause of s2 and
viceversa. However, a version of model III in which there are no arrows
between d and a and b satisfies independence since there is some cause of
s1, namely a, which is not n-connected to s2, and conversely there is some
cause of s2, namely b, which is also not n-connected to s1. The details are
crucial here to assess whether or not independence obtains.
On the other hand causal models V and VI unambiguously fail Haus-
man’s test. For instance in model V there is no cause of s2 that is not
n-connected to s1 including the setting event b which in this model is ex-
hypotesis a partial direct cause of s1. Or take model VI in its full causal
reading: no cause of s1 (s2) fails in this model to be n-connected to s2
(s1), even if it is via a backwards in time causal influence upon the common
cause c. Regardless of how we interpret the model as long as the influences
are taken to be causal, the independence condition will fail, and Hausman’s
independence theory of causation (C) will be violated.
But notice what a bizarre consequence this seems to be. We have con-
cluded that models IV, V, VI and some admissible versions of models I and
III all fail the independence test. Hausman’s analysis would unambiguously
classify them as failed causal models, not because they conflict with the
physics or the experiments, but simply because they fail his independence
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test. And this is supposed to be as a result of some conceptual truths about
causation, such as the independence condition. I find it then extremely
implausible that these models would have been the subject of any debate
regarding their possible incompatibility with special theory of relativity. For
notice that the only reason why the threat of incompatibility has bothered
physicists and philosophers alike is the causal reading of the special relativ-
ity theory, and particularly the light cone structure. If models I, III, IV, V
and VI are not properly causal why would anyone have cared about their
incompatibility with special relativity in the first place? Yet we intensely
care about the incompatibility issue. What this shows, I believe, is that
these models are eminently causal, and universally thought to be so among
both philosophers and physicists. There seems to be nothing in our con-
cept of causation to prevent us thinking that these models are causal (we
might disagree on whether they are plausible models, but we do not disagree
over the fact that they are causal in nature). Put in another way: if it fell
naturally out of our concept of causation that these models for the EPR
correlations are not causal, why would anyone like Van Fraassen (who pre-
sumably shares our concept) spend so much time and effort trying to rule
them out as impossible or implausible?
To sum up, it seems to me that Hausman was wrong to rule out all models
of the EPR correlations as non-causal, since at least three of these models
satisfy his conditions. Instead of using his theory to rule out all causal
models for the EPR correlations, the independence condition can be more
helpfully applied to distinguish between these models. But then the fact
that another four of these models are ruled out as non-causal by Hausman’s
theory is, I believe, just as much of an indictment of his theory – for it
shows that our concept of causation, which we seem perfectly prepared to
apply to microscopic physics, is neither exhausted by nor in agreement with
Hausman’s independence condition. These models seem to refute Hausman’s
claim that independence (the (I) condition) is a conceptual truth about
causality.
5.3 Reply to Price’s asymmetry argument
For the purposes of analysis it is helpful to explicitly list the premises in
Huw Price’s argument, reviewed in section 3.3. Price assumes that
i) causation is agent based notion, roughly: a causes b if and only if an
agent could bring about b by producing a.
ii) this is explicitly a modal notion: what counts is what agents would be
able to do in the appropriate circumstances, and not what a particular
agent is capable of doing.
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iii) Since causation is agent-based, it is limited to the macroscopic world
that agents operate in.
iv) In particular the agent-based theory is not directly applicable to mi-
crophysics.
v) The only sense of causation that would be applicable in microphysics
is a projection from our macroscopic based concepts of causation.
vi) Our macroscopic concept of causation is time-oriented, because agency
in the macroscopic world always is: we act in order to bring about
effects in the future, not in the past.
vii) In other words, the macroscopic concept of causation is tied up to
a notion of macroscopic innocence, according to which systems that
interact keep a record of the interaction in their future history but not
in their past history.
viii) But the equivalent notion of innocence in microphysics (µ-innocence)
is false, since it conflicts with the fact that the fundamental laws of
microphysics are invariant under time reversal, or T-symmetric.
ix) Hence properly speaking there is no causation in microphysics.
x) It is possible to build models of the EPR correlations that abandon
µ-innocence, such as model VI in section 4.
xi) This model is not properly speaking causal, since it lacks the temporal
asymmetry of our ordinary agent-based concept of causation.
xii) But the model uniquely solves the problem of explaining the EPR
correlations, without any appeal to non-locality.
xiii) This in turn strengthens the claim (ix) that there is no genuine cau-
sation in microphysics.
Let us first consider Price’s claim regarding model VI. Price assumes
that this is not a properly speaking causal model. The arrows pointing
back from the setting events a and b towards the common cause d are not
to be thought of as causal influences (and should not be represented as
continuous world lines). But it is very hard to see why, from the point of
view of an agent-based theory of causation, these influences should not be
counted as perfectly causal. After all if an agent was interested in bringing
about a particular outcome of the spin measurement on particle “2”, the
best they could possibly do would be to orient the magnetometers in a
particular direction. True, they would have to have some knowledge about
the orientation of the distant magnetometer, in order to be able to change
the probabilities of the possible outcomes in their own wing. And if they
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knew both distant setting and distant outcome, then they would actually
be able to bring about a plus or a minus outcome, with probability one, as
the measurement outcome event in their own wing, simply by orienting the
magnetometer appropriately. It is hard to see why this would fail to qualify
as a proper intervention to bring about an effect. The fact that the causal
influence must first go backwards in time to change the initial state of the
particle pair before affecting the final outcome on the distant wing seems,
from the strict point of view of an agency theory, neither here nor there. At
least in this scenario the fact that some of the causing is backwards seems
irrelevant to the possibility of the kind intervention demanded by an agency
theory.
What I think this reflection shows is that Price conflates two different
causal commitments (or axioms) into one. There is the commitment strictly
embraced by an agency theory, which is expressed in our premisses i) and
ii) above. Then there is the commitment deriving from the time-symmetry
of causation in the macroscopic domain, namely that causes always precede
effects. In the macroscopic world, given the second law of thermodynam-
ics, these commitments coincide; and the agency theory then builds in an
asymmetry in its concept of causation. This is in effect the implication of
premisses iii) to vii) in Price’s argument. But the two commitments come
apart in the microscopic domain, where the second law no longer applies.
Price extracts the conclusion that agency theories are not applicable there,
and therefore causation overall fails (premise ix). But one could extract pre-
cisely the opposite implication, namely that agency theories no longer carry
a commitment to temporal asymmetry in that domain. In other words, the
microscopic domain forces us to distinguish between our two commitments
regarding the nature of causation, and then choose which of them we will
take as primary. If we take the temporal asymmetry commitment as primary
then model VI is not a causal model, by definition, since the influences from
the settings to the source are back-in-time. But if we take the agent-based
commitment to be primary then model VI is a causal model, since agents set
on bringing about particular outcome-values in the distant wing can affect
the probabilities for those outcomes by means of their settings (as long as
the settings in the other wing are known to them in advance).
It is unclear to me which of these two commitments is primary for Price.
What is clear is that he has run them together in the microscopic domain
in a way that I believe to be both mistaken and unhelpful. If instead we
distinguish these commitments we can have a far more detailed and nuanced
analysis of the status of agent based causality in the EPR experiment in
particular, and in the domain of microphysics in general.
We can now approach all the other causal models in the light of this
distinction. We will see that in some of these models we are in effect forced
to make a similar choice between agency-based account and a temporal
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asymmetry account. Models I, V and VI, and some versions of model III
are causal in the agency-based sense but not in the temporal asymmetric
sense if we apply relativity theory and consider time order in all frames of
reference. Model IV is causal in the time-asymmetry sense but not in the
agent-based sense (since clearly no agent can control a whole hypersurface
of spacetime).
Model II is a curiosly problematic model for Price’s argument. This
model is causal in both the agency-based sense and the temporal asymmet-
ric sense. The cause c precedes the effects s1 and s2, and the state can be
altered so as to bring about different statistics (by e.g. replacing the singlet
with a different kind of entangled state). Indeed in this model the conflation
between the agency-based commitment and the time-asymmetric commit-
ment that we saw was operating in the macroscopic domain is fully restored
even though it is a model of phenomena in the microscopic domain. A per-
fectly legitimate causal model of microphysical correlations that obeys both
of Price’s causal axioms! Model II can hardly be said to be less explana-
tory than Price’s own model, among other things because it does away with
relativistic non-locality altogether, like Price’s model. So it is difficult to
see why anyone who is commited to both axioms regarding causality would
opt for model VI at the expense of model II. The problem for Price is that
he is one of those people apparently commited to both axioms, which sug-
gests that on the grounds of his own preferred theory of causation he should
abandon the model that he has been defending for the EPR correlations for
the last twenty years, and adopt instead the simpler model II.33
In situations where the settings are predetermined, however, model II is
not causal in the agency-based sense, since there is no handle for agents to
operate to bring about effects independently. So the model becomes causal
only in the temporal asymmetric sense. If Price preferred to choose model
VI instead of model II he would be showing that his real commitment lies
with the agency-based axiom, not the temporal asymmetric axiom. In any
case, the choice between all these different models, in their different interpre-
tations, opens up a route to test the real commitments underlying Price’s
theory of causation. My guess is that he would try to stick to both for
as long as possible but if forced to choose might opt for temporal asym-
metry. In either case, once the choice has been made between these two
commitments, plenty of possibilities are still available to explain causally
the EPR correlations: the causal perspective has been shown to be just as
good for microphysics (and microphysicsts!) as it is for ordinary cognition
33But of course the price to pay would be Price’s argument for causal perspectivalism
which requires us to accept that causation is not part of the ultimate furniture of the
universe as described by fundamental physics. A thorough pragmatist should have no
fear to pay that price, I contend, since a causal description of phenomena is a pragmatic
option, available to physicists as well as anyone else.
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and practice.
6 Conclusions and Prospects
I hope to have shown that all arguments so far to the effect that causation
is ruled out in microphysics on account of the EPR correlations are unwar-
ranted and premature. Much more philosophical work still needs to be done
in order to establish the ways in which the different theories of causation
can be applied to explain quantum correlation phenomena. It seems also
clear that the question “are the EPR correlations causal?” in general has
no informative answer. To answer this question we have to engage with the
details both of the different theories of causation and the different possible
models for the EPR correlations. Different combinations of causal theories
and empirical models will yield different answers to this question.
In his brilliant 1998 book on quantum probability and non-locality, Mi-
chael Dickson showed how typical metaphysical questions regarding the no-
tion of locality in quantum mechanics (such as “is the nature of the quantum
world non-local?”) have no general or universal answers. These questions
can only be informatively answered by considering how the different notions
of locality fare with respect to each and every interpretation of quantum
mechanics. And we should expect the answers to be different and even con-
trary in different cases.34 The kind of non-locality built into Bohm’s theory
is not the same as is built into Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theories, or the modal
interpretation. The same lesson I think applies to the nature of causation in
quantum mechanics. We are unlikely to learn much from attempts to com-
pletely rule causation out, or completely rule it in. We will probably learn
much more if we proceed in an unprejudiced and cautious way to a detailed
and piecemeal study of all the different concrete possibilities instead.
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